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Back in the early 2000s, I had an informal conversation with a social impact advisor
from the Asian Developed Bank (ADB) regarding the impact of Chinese aid in Laos. The
advisor told me that she was concerned about the increasing in uence of China on the
Lao government, as it made ADB’s development strategy ineffective. As Chinese-
funded infrastructure did not require either mitigation strategies or environmental
and social impact assessments, it made it harder for ADB (and others) to insist on such
measures. Due do China’s increasing prominence, she alleged, ADB risked cancelling
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itself out of the competitive market of infrastructure development contracts in Laos,
thus losing any ability to safeguard basic social, environmental, and human rights
standards.
In this essay, I use this anecdote as a point of departure to consider China’s impact on
another important issue within the Mekong countries: labour migration. The
predicament of this ADB advisor highlights the dif culties of imposing development-
led social and environmental conditionalities within a context of increasing dominance
of Chinese aid. Furthermore, although infrastructure projects constitute state-led
development, they take place within a neoliberal aid environment where market
mechanisms structure how development actors project human rights-based
conditionalities. I suggest that current efforts to introduce humanitarian and human
rights standards in labour migration—commonly through discourses of anti-traf cking
and modern slavery—signal a shift away from state to market actors in development.
Although it may seem to bypass state-centric responses to labour exploitation, this
new strategy may face a similar dilemma to the ADB consultant mentioned above due
to China’s growing role in the region. This, as we will see below, can be seen in the
seafood industry.
Development-migration Nexus between China and the
Mekong Region
One of the central changes to development aid in the Mekong region has been the
ascendance of China as a bilateral aid actor. This is particularly pertinent in countries,
such as Laos, where Chinese-led infrastructure, commercial agriculture, mining, and
extraterritorial casinos have received considerable scholarly attention (Baird 2011;
Diana 2018; Nyíri 2012; Tan 2014). The construction of a Chinese railway connecting
mainland China with its Southeast Asian neighbours is one of the latest steps within
this larger trend. In a country like Laos, it is a well-known fact among aid practitioners
that although western-based development assistance may have been dominant in the
recent past, it is increasingly looking like a sideshow compared to Chinese aid and
investment.
Parallel to this shift, given the strong focus of ASEAN and Mekong countries on
infrastructure development—especially road construction—and the liberalisation of
trade and mobility, labour migration has also become a central pillar in the region’s
development efforts. For this reason, the aid sector has given increasing attention to
the development-migration nexus in the Mekong region. Partly dovetailing with the
European Union, ASEAN rece tly introduced an internal skilled migration mobility
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programme under the auspices of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Still, the
number of skilled migrants who can now travel freely thanks to this initiative is
dwarfed by the huge amount of unskilled migrants who form the backbone of key
economic sectors, such as agriculture, construction, and seafood processing. Although
numbers are imprecise, in Thailand alone the unskilled labour migration population is
estimated to be several million (Auethavornpipat 2017).
To date, labour migration from China to Mekong countries has been limited and
primarily concerned with the Chinese labour exodus in the context of Chinese-backed
investment. In fact, the main connection between China and the Mekong countries in
relation to migration has arguably been through more sinister sides of migration, in
particular human traf cking. For example, the United Nations has pointed to the
considerable outmigration of young women from Myanmar and Laos to China, where
concerns are being raised about possible traf cking and forced marriages (UNIAP
2013). Anti-traf cking has also been a central conduit for China’s multilateral
cooperation with Mekong governments, such as the Memorandum of Understanding
on Cooperation against Traf cking in Persons in the Greater Mekong Sub-region
(COMMIT), which has served as the main vehicle for multilateral engagement on anti-
traf cking among Mekong countries since its conception in 2004.
Yet to fully grasp the importance of China in relation to migration and development in
the Mekong region it is important to grasp how anti-traf cking discourses and
practices have changed in recent years.
From State to Market Anti-traf cking Discourses
In the Mekong region, the earliest anti-traf cking interventions by development aid
actors emerged during the 1990s, with the  rst interventions being framed as poverty-
reduction strategies. However, in the subsequent decades the sector followed a global
trend to include a strong law enforcement focus, coupled with awareness-raising
efforts and support for victims (Molland 2012). In other words, anti-traf cking became
heavily state-centric as law enforcement and immigration authorities came to play
central roles in anti-traf cking responses.
Yet, anti-traf cking has faced sustained criticisms both from academics and
practitioners who point out that interventions often are counterproductive, tend to
prioritise border control agendas, and—partly as a result of the latter—end up working
against the very people they aim to assist (Anderson 2012; Keo et al. 2014). In Mekong
countries, these criticisms are paralleled by a notable donor and programme fatigue
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within the anti-traf cking sector. Other nomenclatures, such as ‘modern slavery’, have
gained momentum. In contrast to anti-traf cking interventions, modern slavery places
stronger focus on consumers and the corporate sector’s possible complicity in
exploitative and ‘slave-like’ labour, and enjoys considerable  nancial backing from
philanthro-capitalists such as Australia’s mining millionaire Andrew Forrest and eBay’s
founder Pierre Omidyar. Rather than an explicit focus on border control and police,
modern slavery broadens activities to focus on ‘supply chain governance’ and
consumer ethics. Governments too, such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and
California, have all promulgated legislation that mandates companies to report on
their efforts to clean up their supply chains.
While the modern slavery discourse has also been forcefully critiqued (Gallagher 2017),
it is notable how it broadens activism from the state to market. Although this
discourse has only recently crept into Mekong-based NGOs and UN agencies, it is
striking how in that context a previous concern with ‘sex traf cking’ has been largely
replaced with concerns regarding slavery-like work conditions, with particular
attention to the Thai seafood sector. It is also here that we see the discourse of supply
chain governance opening up a space where it becomes possible to think about
consumer boycotts. In Thailand this has become a political reality, with the European
Union threating a boycott of Thai seafood on environmental (over shing) and
humanitarians grounds (abusive labour). In contrast to ongoing political pressure from
the United States government through its annual Traf cking in Persons Report —
where Thailand has been routinely poorly ranked—a potential seafood boycott has a
far larger impact: the former is primarily a question of losing political face; the latter
will seriously affect the Thai economy. As such, it is precisely this kind of action that
advocates of ‘modern slavery’ suggest can have a positive impact on the work
conditions of poor, unskilled migrant workers in the Mekong region and beyond.
China and Seafood
At  rst glance, China appears entirely absent from these developments. Although the
Chinese authorities engage with the region on human traf cking issues, they do not
seem to have picked up on the emerging modern slavery agenda in dealing with their
neighbours. Nor is China a central consumer of Thai seafood. Yet, this can all easily
change, and for a very simple reason.
Today, China accounts for 35 percent of total global  sh production and 30 percent of
global consumption (World Bank and FAO 2013). Although China has a substantial
domestic seafood production, it is already the third largest importer of seafood in the
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world. Its role as a seafood consumer is set to increase signi cantly in the next few
years, as the country is the fastest growing consumer of seafood globally (World Bank
and FAO 2013). Given the regional proximity of Southeast Asia, countries like Thailand
may become a growing market to cater to China’s seafood consumption.
To date, there is no notable human rights discourse or insistence on human rights-
based conditionalities relating to Chinese consumer markets and imports. Yet, there
seems to be a surprising lack of re ection amongst United Nations agencies and NGO
practitioners regarding how China can in uence their strategies. Soon, anti-traf cking
and modern slavery abolitionists may  nd themselves in a similar situation to the ADB
consultant mentioned at the beginning of this essay: either pursue a strategy of
imposing conditionalities, thus effectively locking yourself out of the very market you
attempt to impact, or simply abandon any attempt to impose ethical conditions.
Two Lessons
There are two main lessons to be drawn from all this. First, tragicomically, the end
result may be similar to what has been observed in the fair-trade movement more
broadly: moulding markets into humane emancipatory projects which ensure fair
prices is hard to achieve in practice. Yet, one thing such market-based initiatives do
achieve is to commodify social movements. Hence, despite an of cial claim of aid
actors to be transforming markets into ethical practices, the reverse is actually taking
place: markets transform aid actors.
Second, if consumers of seafood are meant to be a central actor in the eradication of
‘modern slavery’ in Thailand’s  shing sector through ethically based conditionalities
within seafood trade, it is dif cult to see how this will be effective within the context
of China’s emerging role as a seafood consumer. Philanthro-capitalist initiatives, such
as the modern slavery agenda, may unintentionally open another space within the aid
sector where China will be able to dominate just as it already does in other spheres. In
the long run, a ‘modern slavery’ agenda in the Mekong region may end up
marginalising its own space of humanitarian consumer activism, and China’s growing
importance in the region is at the heart of this process.
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